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 This article explores the reasons for the current dominance of the nonprofit
 form in the high-culture performing arts, and concludes that this development
 is a response to the need for price discrimination in that sector. The article
 develops a model of a nonprofit performing arts organization based on this
 analysis, and employs the model to explore, first, the consequences to be
 expected if such an organization adopts any of various plausible objective
 functions, and second, the circumstances in which subsidies to such an
 organization are justified and the way in which such subsidies should be
 structured.
 1. Introduction
 ? The live performing arts?including orchestral music, opera, theater, and
 ballet?are today in large part the product of nonprofit institutions. At the
 same time, there remain some segments ofthe performing arts, such as Broad-
 way theater, that are vigorously for-profit (and profitable?see Moore, 1968,
 p. 12). Moreover, in the past profit-seeking institutions were apparently the rule
 rather than the exception in the performing arts; not only serious theater but
 even symphony orchestras were commonly proprietary. The dominance of
 nonprofit institutions in this industry is largely the product of recent decades,
 and is still far from complete.1
 The existing literature offers no satisfying analysis of the factors that have
 caused this industry to become so heavily nonprofit, nor does it offer much in
 the way of a positive or normative perspective on the behavior of the nonprofit
 firms involved. Perhaps as a consequence, there also exists no well-articulated
 rationale for public subsidies to the performing arts, much less a coherent set
 of criteria by which to determine the appropriate amount and structure of such
 subsidies. This article addresses each of these issues.
 2. Why are the performing arts nonprofit?
 ? Donative financing. Nearly all nonprofit performing arts groups depend upon
 donations for a substantial fraction?commonly between one-third and one-
 * University of Pennsylvania.
 I am particularly indebted to Alvin Klevorick, Richard Nelson, Oliver Williamson,
 Sidney Winter, and the referees for helpful comments. Preparation of this paper was supported
 by a grant from the Program on Non-Profit Organizations at the Institution for Social and Policy
 Studies, Yale University.
 1 Among theaters, nonprofits are most commonly to be found in local and regional stock and
 repertory companies and off-Broadway, and are primarily a development of the period since World
 War II (Moore, 1968, pp. 16-20, 100; Baumol and Bowen, 1968, pp. 57-60). On the institutional
 history of symphony orchestras, see Mayernik (1976, p. 19).
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 half?of their income (Baumol and Bowen, 1968, pp. 147-157). Because, for
 reasons that I shall return to below, an organization that is dependent upon
 donations must generally be organized as a nonprofit, this pattern of financing
 provides a preliminary explanation for the predominance ofthe nonprofit form in
 this industry. But why are the performing arts so heavily financed by donations?
 In other sectors such donative financing for nonprofits sometimes serves
 as a means for supporting the private production of public goods (Hansmann,
 1980, pp. 848-854; Weisbrod, 1975). Consistent with this notion, it has fre-
 quently been argued that the performing arts exhibit substantial beneficial
 externalities, and that this in turn provides a rationale for both public and
 private subsidies (Baumol and Bowen, 1968, chapter 16; Netzer, 1978, chapter
 2). For example, prominent cultural institutions bring prestige and tourism to
 both the city and the nation. Likewise, such institutions may, through indirect
 processes of cultural stimulus and transmission, ultimately contribute to the
 cultural experience even of people who do not attend their performances.
 But the ratio of such external benefits to the private benefits (that is, those
 enjoyed by members of the audience) for any performance is doubtless rather
 small?much smaller than the ratio of contributions to ticket receipts for the
 organizations involved.2 In any case, it does not appear that such external
 benefits are a major stimulus for the donations received by performing arts
 groups. Indeed, the evidence is strongly to the contrary, for it appears that the
 great bulk of the donations received by performing arts groups comes from
 people who actually attend the groups' performances, and not from the other
 members of the public who partake only of the prestige and other external
 benefits that the performances confer upon them.3
 Another explanation commonly encountered is that donations are a private
 subsidy that enables ticket prices to be kept down to levels at which they
 can be purchased by people who could not otherwise afford them. Undoubtedly
 this is part of the motivation of at least some who contribute. Yet the vast
 majority of people who attend the performing arts are quite well-heeled (Baumol
 and Bowen, 1968, chapter 4). Surely it is doubtful that the performing arts are
 organized on a nonprofit basis primarily to provide a vehicle whereby the rich
 can subsidize the merely prosperous.
 The situation, then, is at first appearance rather paradoxical. Here we have
 a service, essentially private in character, financed partly by donations and
 partly by revenue from ticket sales. Yet the people who donate are also the
 people who attend the performances?that is, who buy tickets. Moreover, it
 appears that performing arts organizations commonly price their tickets so low
 that they operate well within the inelastic portion of their demand curve, thus
 failing to maximize receipts from ticket sales (Baumol and Bowen, 1968, pp.
 2 Moore (1968, chapter 8) and Peacock (1976) are also skeptical about the magnitude of the
 public benefits involved.
 As noted below, however, a performing arts production is to an important extent a public
 good for those individuals who are among the audience. Thus, if someone who has already
 purchased a subscription to the Metropolitan Opera makes a donation to that organization, the
 improvement in the quality ofthe performances that the donation permits will be enjoyed as a public
 good by all others who also hold subscriptions.
 3 Direct data on the proportion of donations coming from audience members are apparently
 unavailable. Some indication is provided, however, by the evidence, discussed below, indicating
 that a substantial percentage of those who attend also contribute.
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 272-278). Why do these organizations seek to extract part of their reve?
 nues from the audience through donations, rather than simply by raising
 their ticket prices?
 ? Price discrimination. These phenomena all become understandable if we
 simply recognize contributions in the performing arts as a form of voluntary
 price discrimination.4
 The considerable costs of organizing, directing, rehearsing, and providing
 scenery and costumes for a performing arts production are essentially fixed
 costs, unrelated to audience size. Marginal costs are correspondingly low:
 once one performance has been staged, the cost of an additional performance
 is relatively small, and, as long as the theater is unfilled, the cost of admitting
 another individual to a given performance is close to zero. At the same time,
 the potential audience for high-culture live entertainment is limited even in large
 cities; consequently, for any given production there are typically only a few
 performances over which to spread the fixed costs?often three or fewer for an
 orchestral program and only several times that for opera, ballet, and many
 theatrical productions. Thus, fixed costs represent a large fraction of total costs
 for each production.5
 The result is that if ticket prices are set close to marginal cost, admissions
 receipts will fail to cover total costs. Indeed, it appears likely that for most
 productions staged by nonprofit performing arts groups the demand curve lies
 below the average cost curve at all points, so that there exists no ticket price
 at which total admission receipts will cover total costs.
 If the organizations involved could engage in price discrimination, they
 might be able to capture enough of the potential consumer surplus to enable
 them to cover their costs.6 In the performing arts, however, the effectiveness
 of discriminatory ticket pricing is limited by the difficulty of identifying
 individuals or groups with unusually inelastic demand, and by the difficulty of
 making admission tickets nontransferable. To be sure, a degree of price dis?
 crimination can be, and often is, affected by charging higher prices for more
 desirable seats: if those patrons whose demand for a given performance
 is most inelastic also have the strongest relative preference for good seats
 over bad seats, then it may well be possible to establish a price schedule that
 will channel those with inelastic demand into the good seats at high prices,
 4 Moore (1968, pp. 120-121) also alludes briefly to contributions as a means of price
 discrimination, though he does not pursue the issue.
 5 It is difficult to obtain useful data comparing fixed costs with variable costs for productions
 by performing arts groups. Existing studies of economies of scale in the nonprofit performing arts
 (Baumol and Bowen, 1968, chapter 8; Globerman and Book, 1974) simply correlate cost per
 performance with the total number of performances per year for different organizations (e.g.,
 symphony orchestras or theater groups) without taking into account the number of different
 productions represented by those performances. Data on Broadway theater assembled by Moore
 (1968, chapter 3) are, however, suggestive; they show that, for the 1960-1961 season, weekly
 operating cost?i.e., the (variable) cost ofa week's performances?for a show was, on average,
 less than a fifth as large as the (fixed) cost of producing the show.
 6 Here and in what follows I assume that nonprofit performing arts firms have some
 degree of monopoly power, and thus face downward-sloping demand curves. This is in keeping
 with the observation that demand is limited and fixed costs are high, thus presumably making
 competition unworkable. It is also in keeping with the very limited competition that in fact pre-
 vails among the nonprofit performing arts; even New York City supports only one major symphony
 orchestra, two substantial opera companies, and a handful of (highly differentiated) dance groups.
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 and those with more elastic demand into the inferior seats at lower prices.7
 This device is limited, however, by the strength of the preference for good
 seats over bad that is exhibited by patrons whose demand for performing arts
 productions is relatively inelastic.8
 Yet, even if it is difficult to establish effective price discrimination via
 ticket pricing, it is still possible to ask individuals simply to volunteer to pay
 an additional amount if the value they place upon attendance exceeds the price
 charged for admission. And this, in effect, is the approach taken by nonprofit
 organizations in the performing arts.
 Of course, the services paid for by a voluntary contribution to a per?
 forming arts group are public goods for all individuals who attend the group's
 performances,9 and there is a clear incentive to be a free rider. As a conse?
 quence, many people contribute nothing, and presumably most of those who do
 contribute give something less than their full potential consumer surplus. Never-
 theless, many individuals do contribute when confronted with solicitations
 pointing out that, in the absence of contributions, the organizations on which
 they depend for entertainment may disappear. Indeed, it appears that roughly
 40% of those who attend the live performing arts contribute at least occasionally
 (Baumol and Bowen, 1968, pp. 307-308).
 The fact that contributions to nonprofit performing arts groups are de?
 ductible under the federal income tax is undoubtedly important in reducing
 the incentive to be a free rider (see Section 4). Donors' committees and other
 organizational strategies are also presumably important in creating incentives
 and social pressure to help overcome free-rider behavior10?though here,
 as in the case of many other private nonprofits providing public goods (such
 as those devoted to political causes, environmental protection, and medical
 research), a surprisingly large number of individuals seem willing to respond
 even to impersonal solicitations received by mail.
 Those areas of the performing arts that are organized on a profit-seeking
 basis typically differ from the areas that are nonprofit in having a much larger
 audience over which to spread the fixed costs of a production, so that the ratio
 of fixed to variable costs is relatively small, and there is consequently little
 difference between marginal and average cost. Broadway shows, for example,
 typically run for several hundred performances (Moore, 1968, chapter 1 and
 Table A-6). Similarly, although the cost of producing a movie commonly runs
 into many millions of dollars, the audience over which that cost can be spread
 is enormous; consequently, only about 15% of movie theater receipts is devoted
 to covering production costs (Gordon, 1976). Therefore, substantial price dis-
 7 See Winter's (1968) analysis of essentially the same issue in a different context. It also
 follows from Winter's analysis that, when constructing a new theater, there may well be gains to be
 had from creating a high ratio of bad seats to good seats, even if it would be as cheap or cheaper
 to construct a larger proportion of good seats for the same total capacity.
 8 Likewise, the performing arts are not well situated to take advantage of the type of two-
 part tariffs described by Oi (1971), since many people wish to attend only one performance by a
 given organization and since it is difficult to make tickets nontransferable.
 9 See note 2.
 10 To some extent, contributions undoubtedly represent an effort to buy recognition and
 status. Many organizations in the performing arts exploit this motivation quite consciously by
 publicizing the names of donors and by arranging special social events for them. But the
 development of the performing arts as a locus for such conspicuous giving seems most probably
 a consequence rather than a cause of their nonprofit donatively-financed status.
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 crimination?and, in particular, voluntary price discrimination?is not neces?
 sary for survival, and thus the nonprofit form loses its special comparative
 advantage. Since, in the absence of such a comparative advantage, nonprofit
 firms seem, for a number of reasons, to be less efficient producers than for-
 profit firms (Hansmann, 1980, pp. 877-879), it is to be expected that competi?
 tion should favor for-profit firms in these areas.
 Note that this analysis also suggests an explanation for the observed
 tendency, noted above, of nonprofit performing arts organizations to price
 their tickets below the level that maximizes total admissions receipts ? much
 less the level that maximizes receipts in excess of variable costs. It seems
 likely that an increase in ticket prices will generally lead to a decrease in dona?
 tions, since the total reservoir of consumer surplus from which those donations
 derive will decrease.11 Consequently, total revenue?which includes both ticket
 sales receipts and donations ? will be maximized at a lower ticket price than
 that which maximizes admissions receipts alone.
 ? Some historical evidence. The analysis offered here may also help to explain
 why nonprofit organizations have become increasingly prominent in the per?
 forming arts through the years. Because productivity in the live performing
 arts has not grown at the same pace as in the economy at large, the cost of
 performing arts productions has increased disproportionately to that of most
 other goods (Baumol and Bowen, 1968, chapters 8, 9). As a consequence?
 and also, undoubtedly, because of competition from new entertainment media
 such as movies, radio, and television ? demand for the live performing arts has
 remained small, and even, by some measures, declined (Baumol and Bowen,
 1968, chapter 3). Beyond this, however, it appears that fixed costs have con?
 sistently risen at a faster rate than have variable costs, and thus have come to
 represent an increasingly large share of total costs.12 These developments
 have presumably given nonprofit organizations, with their access to the form of
 price discrimination described above, an increasing advantage over their
 profit-seeking counterparts, which are dependent upon ticket sales alone to
 cover both fixed and variable costs.
 ? The nonprofit form. Thus far I have been assuming that even if an individual
 is willing to donate money to a performing arts group above and beyond the
 amount he must pay for a ticket, he will do so only if the organization involved
 is nonprofit, and not if it is profit-seeking. That is, only nonprofits will have
 access to the form of voluntary price discrimination I have been describing.
 Although the reason that this is so may seem obvious, it is perhaps worth
 11 Baumol and Bowen (1968, p. 277) report that their interviews with managerial personnel
 in fact revealed a fear that increased ticket prices would lead to reduced contributions. Although
 Baumol and Bowen devote little attention to this relationship between contributions and ticket
 prices, they offer no alternative explanation for the tendency to set prices at a level where demand
 is inelastic, other than the possibility that management feels that by keeping prices low they are
 fulfilling a social obligation to make the performing arts available to as much of the populace as
 possible. The behavior of a firm that has the latter objective, yet is dependent upon donative
 financing, is explored in Sections 3 and 4 below.
 12 In terms of constant dollars, average production costs for Broadway theater increased by
 236% between 1927 and 1961, while weekly operating costs increased by only 80%. This relative
 increase in production costs was evidently responsible for the fact that the length of run required
 for a Broadway show to make a profit roughly tripled over this period (Moore, 1968, pp. 11 -12, 34).
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 being somewhat more explicit. A more detailed discussion appears in my earlier
 article (1980) on nonprofit enterprise.
 When a contributor gives money to, say, an opera company, he is actually
 trying to ''buy" something?namely more and better opera. Such contributions
 differ from ordinary prices paid for goods and services in that the latter are
 clearly and directly conditioned upon specific, identifiable activity on the
 part of the person to whom the price is paid, such as delivering certain goods
 to the purchaser or permitting him to occupy a given seat at a given per?
 formance in a given theater. That is, when one pays what we usually term a
 ''price," one commonly knows whether the services offered in exchange were
 performed satisfactorily and can seek redress if they were not. But with those
 payments that we term "donations," things are more difficult.
 Suppose that an opera company solicits donations and asserts that it will
 devote all funds received to the production of opera. And suppose that an
 individual, in reliance on that representation, contributes. How does he know
 that his money was in fact devoted to opera productions? His only meaningful
 assurance lies in the opera company's nonprofit form of organization. For a
 nonprofit organization is in essence an organization that is barred by law from
 distributing net earnings ? that is, anything beyond reasonable remuneration?
 to persons who exercise control over it, such as its directors, officers, or
 .members. Consequently, one can make contributions to such an organization
 >tojth some assurance that they will be devoted to production of the organiza-
 tioh's services. With a profit-seeking organization it is difficult to obtain such
 assurance where, as with the performing arts, the connection between an in?
 dividual contribution and increased production of services is not directly
 observable.
 ? Summary. In sum, it appears that nonprofit firms in the performing arts,
 like their for-profit counterparts, serve primarily to sell entertainment to an
 audience. The difference between the two types of firms lies simply in the way
 in which payment is received. But the difference has significant consequences.
 The nonprofit firm, through its access to voluntary price discrimination, is
 viable in segments of the performing arts market where for-profit firms cannot
 3. The economic behavior of performing arts organizations
 ? The firm's objectives. Presumably profit maximization is excluded as an
 objective for any legitimate nonprofit; consequently, the organization must
 select other goals. This choice of goals may be in the hands of any one or
 more of several individuals or groups, including performers, directors, pro?
 ducers, professional managers, substantial donors, and donors' committees.
 13 There are areas other than the performing arts in which similar factors seem to be at work.
 For example, one of the most interesting and most obvious examples of the type of voluntary
 price discrimination described here is provided by New York's Metropolitan Museum of Art, which
 requires that every visitor pay some amount to gain admission, but leaves each visitor entirely
 free to determine how much to pay. In this connection it should be noted that museums are
 seemingly characterized by an even higher ratio of fixed costs to marginal costs than are the
 performing arts, yet, like performing arts groups, are in a relatively poor position to implement
 nonvoluntary price discrimination.
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 One likely possibility?particularly if control over the organization lies
 with professionals who have devoted their careers to a particular art form?
 is that the organization will place special emphasis upon the quality of its
 performances. Such a pursuit of quality might take either of two forms. First,
 the organization could seek to make its production of any given work as im-
 pressive as possible, for example by hiring exceptionally skilled performers,
 constructing lavish stage sets, and so forth. Second, the organization could
 choose to produce works that appeal only to the most refined tastes, avoiding
 the more popular items in the repertoire.
 Alternatively, a performing arts group might feel a mission to spread culture
 to as broad a segment of the populace as possible, and consequently seek
 to maximize attendance for any given production. Or, as yet another possibility,
 control might lie in the hands of managers who are organizational empire-
 builders, and who seek simply to maximize the total budget they administer.
 In what follows I shall develop a simple model of a performing arts or?
 ganization, based on the analysis in Section 2, that permits exploration ofthe
 consequences of pursuing each of the alternative objectives just described.
 The exercise is of interest not just as a matter of positive theory but for norma?
 tive purposes as well. At present there is considerable debate concerning the
 way in which the management of performing arts organizations should exercise
 the substantial degree of discretion they enjoy. A recurrent theme in this debate
 is the choice between quality of production and refinement of taste on the one
 hand, and outreach to broader audiences?via lower prices and appeal to more
 popular tastes?on the other (Brustein, 1978).
 In the discussion of the model the term "quality" will generally be
 used in the first of the two senses described here (lavishness of production).
 As noted below, however, the model can be interpreted in terms ofthe second
 form of quality (appeal to refined tastes) as well.
 ? The basic model of the firm. The size of the audience that the organization
 attracts for all performances of a given production (or, alternatively, for all of
 its productions combined) will be denoted by ai,14 whileq represents the quality
 of the work(s) performed. The ticket price P charged for admission to a per?
 formance is expressed by the inverse demand function P = P(n, q), Pn < 0,
 PQ > 0. Total donations received by the firm are taken to be inversely related
 to P and directly related to q, D = D(P, q), Dp < 0, Dq > 0. Expressed in
 terms of n and q, D = D[P(n, q), q] = D(n, q), Dn > 0, DQ ? 0. A special
 case is
 D = 8 [ P(v, q)dv - nP(n, q) j . (1)Jo J
 This is the donation function that would result if all donations were to come
 from individuals who attend performances, and if such individuals were to
 14 In Broadway theater each production is usually organized as a separate "firm" (Baumol
 and Bowen, 1968, p. 20). Most nonprofit performing arts organizations, in contrast, are relatively
 permanent and produce a large number of productions. (This difference in structure is presumably
 explainable at least in part by the need for nonprofit groups to develop strong and stable
 reputations that will provide assurance to potential donors.) Since I shall not be concerned with the
 effect that one production has upon demand for another, the number of productions that a given
 organization undertakes will not be important here.
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 donate, on average, a given fraction, 8, ofthe consumer surplus that they would
 otherwise enjoy at price P and quality g.15
 Total costs are given by C = C(n, q), Cn > 0, Cq > 0. Since the firm is
 nonprofit, net revenue, NR, is constrained to be zero:
 NR = nP(n, q) + D(n, q) - C(n, q) = 0. (2)
 The firm's objective function is given by U = U(n, q), Un > 0, Uq > 0,
 Unn < 0, Uqq ^ 0. For the pure quality maximizer U(n, q) = q, for the pure
 audience maximizer U(n, q) = n\ and for the budget maximizer U(n, q) = C(n, q).
 The firm maximizes U(n, q) subject to (2).16 The Lagrangian is
 4> = U(n, q) + \[nP(n, q) + D(n, q) - C(n, q)]. (3)
 Assuming an interior solution,17 the first-order conditions are (2) and
 NRQ = nPQ + DQ-CQ= - ?? (4)
 A.
 NRn - P + nPn + Dn - C? = - -^ , (5)
 A.
 where NRq = dNRIdq, etc, and X is the Lagrange multiplier.
 The slope of the nonprofit constraint (2) at the point at which the firm





 |AW=0 NRq Uq
 For the quality maximizer, for which Un = 0 and Uq = 1, this slope is zero;
 for the audience maximizer, for which Un = 1 and Uq = 0, the slope is -<?.
 These points are shown, respectively, as a and b in Figure 1. If the firm
 values both quality and audience size, so that Un > 0 and Uq > 0, then the firm
 will operate at a point such as point c on the are between points a and b.
 Consumer surplus, which I shall denote by S, and which I shall use as a
 measure of welfare (see Willig, 1976), is given by18
 S =  P(v,q)dv -C(n,q). (7)
 This expression is at a maximum with respect to q and n when
 Sn = P - Cn = 0 (8)
 Sq  PQ(v, q)dv - Cq = 0. (9)
 15 An important issue that will be avoided here is the degree to which an organization can
 and will use some of its income to solicit further donations.
 16 See Newhouse (1970) and Feldstein (1971) for other models of nonprofit firms (in particular,
 hospitals) with similar objective functions.
 17 The second-order condition, both here and for the altered models of the firm below, is
 \[2NR?NRqNR,tq - NRlNRqq - NR2qNR,ut] + 2NR?NRqU,tq - NR*Uqq - NR2qUHlt > 0.
 18 Note that, by virtue of the nonprofit constraint (2), (monetary) producer surplus is neces?
 sarily zero here. For simplicity I ignore, in computing 5, changes in the mangers' utility U(n, q).
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 FIGURE 1




 Condition (8) says simply that price should be set equal to marginal cost. Condi?
 tion (9) says that quality should be at a level at which the marginal cost of
 greater quality just equals the marginal valuation put upon quality by the
 audience as a whole. There is no reason to believe, however, that these marginal
 conditions are consistent with the financial constraints under which the nonprofit
 firm must operate. Thus, for example, price can be set as low as marginal cost
 only if donations are sufficiently large to cover fixed costs.
 More relevant to evaluating the performance of the nonprofit firm is the
 constrained social optimum determined by maximizing (7) subject to the
 nonprofit constraint (2). The resulting Lagrangian is 0 = S + yNR, where y




 = Sn+ yNRn =P -Cn+ yNRn = 0  (10)
 -= Sq + yNRq = Pq(v, q)dv - Cq + yNRq = 0. (11)
 dq Jo
 The slope ofthe constraint, NR = 0, at the constrained social optimum, shown




 Pq(v, q)dv - Cq
 (12)
 The nonprofit firm will be operating at the social optimum, given its
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 financing constraints, only if the slope given in (12) is equal to that in (6),
 i.e., only if, at the (n, q) combination chosen by the firm,
 ^= n P~C?_. (13)
 Ua r Pq(v, q)dv - Cq
 Whether or not this condition is satisfied will depend upon the firm's objective
 function as well as upon the cost and demand functions that the firm faces,
 as the following discussion shows.
 ? The quality-maximizing firm. For the quality-maximizing firm, for which
 Uq = 1 and Un = 0, condition (13) will hold, and the firm will be operating
 at the constrained optimum, only if P = Cn. From condition (5), however, it
 follows that for the quality maximizer
 NRn^P + nPn + Dn-Cn = 0. (14)
 That is, for any given quality level, q, the quality maximizer will choose the
 audience size, n, that maximizes its net revenue, which it can in turn use to
 purchase more quality. This is consistent with the condition that P = Cn only
 if Dn = -nPn, which is to say that, at the margin, when audience size in?
 creases (because of a decrease in ticket price) members of the audience in?
 crease their donations by precisely as much as their ticket prices decrease.19
 In terms of the donation function (1), for example, this will be the case only
 if 8 = 1?that is, only if audience members donate 100% of their consumer
 surplus to the firm. In the face of less generous?but more plausible?con?
 tribution levels, the firm will sacrifice audience size too heavily for the sake
 of quality.
 ? The audience-maximizing firm. For the audience maximizer Uq = 0; it there?
 fore follows from (4) that
 NRq = nPq + Dq - Cq = 0. (15)
 That is, for any given audience size, the audience maximizer will choose that
 level of quality that maximizes net revenues, since those revenues can be used
 to reduce ticket prices, which will in turn attract a larger audience.
 From (13), we see that the audience maximizer will operate at the con?
 strained optimum only if Sq = 0 so that condition (9) holds. For (9) to obtain
 when the firm is an audience maximizer?and hence (15) holds?we must have:
 1 fn D
 - Pq(v, q)dv -PQ = -^
 n Jo n
 (16)
 If Dq = 0, then (16) is equivalent to the condition shown by Spence (1975)
 and Sheshinski (1976) to be necessary for a profit-maximizing monopolist
 19 This is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for the quality maximizer to operate at
 the constrained social optimum. If, for example, the locus Sq = 0 lies below the locus NRq = 0?
 the conditions for which are explored below?it is possible that the constrained social optimum
 will be at the quality-minimizing point / rather than the quality-maximizing point a in Figure 1
 when donative behavior is such that Dn = -nPn.
 A similar qualification applies to the discussion of the audience maximizer below.
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 to select the socially optimal level of quality for its product: the valuation
 put upon increases in quality by the average member of the audience must
 equal the valuation put upon such increases by marginal members of the
 audience.
 The interesting fact established by (16), however, is that the responsive?
 ness of donations to changes in quality, Dq, can serve to reduce the incentive
 for the firm to choose a nonoptimal level of q in those cases where the average
 and marginal audience members value quality differently, because donations
 presumably reflect primarily the preferences of inframarginal?and hence more
 typical?audience members. This point appears clearly if we rewrite condition




 Pq(v, q)dv - Pq
 o
 0. (17)
 Here we see that the firm's choice of quality moves closer to the optimum,
 not only as marginal and average consumer valuations of quality converge, but
 also as 8 ?> 1.
 If donations respond as in (1), and if 8 < 1, it is easy to show that, as with the
 profit-maximizing monopolists considered by Spence and Sheshinski, when
 marginal consumers value quality increases less than does the average con?
 sumer?i.e., v/henPqn < 0?the audience maximizer will choose a level of q
 below that which represents the constrained social optimum, while the reverse
 is true if Pqn > 0. (In diagrammatic terms, if Pqn < 0, the locus Sq = 0 lies
 above the locus NRq = 0, as in Figure 1, while the reverse is true if Pqn > 0,
 as in Figure 2 in Section 5; the two loci coincide ifPqn = 0.)
 ? The budget-maximizing firm. For the budget maximizer U(n, q) = C(n, q)
 and, as noted earlier, such a firm will operate at a level of (n, q) such as that
 indicated by point c in Figure 1, intermediate between the points chosen by the
 quality maximizer and the audience maximizer. From the preceding analysis of
 the audience maximizer, it follows that generally the budget maximizer will
 operate at or near the constrained social optimum only if consumer preferences
 for quality are such that Pqn < 0.
 ? Some comparisons. Of the three types of firms analyzed above, which
 is likely to perform most in accord with maximal social welfare? There is,
 interestingly, no simple response?the answer evidently depends heavily upon
 the nature of consumer demand and donative behavior.
 If Pqn > 0, the audience maximizer will unambiguously turn in the best
 performance?at least if donations respond as modeled in (1). In the intuitively
 more plausible case where Pqn < 0, however, the budget maximizer or the
 quality maximizer might perform better; their higher emphasis on quality com-
 pensates for the atypically low taste for quality that characterizes the marginal
 consumer, whose tastes dictate the prices at which tickets can be sold.
 ? Quality as refinement of taste. The discussion so far has proceeded largely
 on the assumption that the variable q represents the first type of quality dis?
 cussed earlier, namely the lavishness with which any given work is produced.
 The model as developed above can, however, alternatively be interpreted with
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 q representing the degree to which the firm's productions appeal to highly
 refined tastes. Viewing the model in these terms, one might assume that the
 amount to be spent on performers, sets, costumes, the director's fee, etc, are
 fixed, leaving the firm free to choose only among works that can be staged with
 these given resources. A quality-maximizing firm would then be one that
 chooses works that appeal to a highly cultured, but also small, audience.20
 In terms of the model, this means that Cq = 0 and, beyond a certain minimal
 level ofq,Pq < 0.21
 The preceding analysis and conclusions remain valid for this alternative
 interpretation of q and the accompanying change of values for Cq and Pq.
 Note, however, that with Cq = 0 the budget maximizer and the audience
 maximizer are identical.
 4. The rationale for subsidies
 ? If the analysis of Section 2 is correct, then the most compelling rationale
 for providing subsidies to performing arts organizations is not that they produce
 external benefits or serve as a vehicle for redistribution of income?which are
 the rationales that have been the primary focus of discussion to date (see Baumol
 and Bowen, 1968, chapter 16; Netzer, 1978, chapter 2)?but rather that the
 high fixed costs that such firms face will, in the absence of a subsidy, force
 them to set prices too high to satisfy marginal criteria for efficiency, and may
 well make them unviable.22
 As in the case of all such subsidies, there is a substantial conflict between
 equity and efficiency. Although the subsidy may help establish efficient pricing,
 the individuals who consume the services financed by the subsidies are likely
 to constitute only a small fraction of the people who pay for them?at least
 if the source of the subsidy is the public fisc. Indeed, given that the class of
 people who attend the performing arts is not only small but unusually
 prosperous and geographically concentrated, the problem of equity raised by
 subsidies is particularly acute.
 5. When is a subsidy efficient?
 ? If a performing arts organization, in the absence of a subsidy, is setting
 its ticket prices well above marginal cost to cover the fixed costs associated
 20 See Baumol and Bowen (1968, pp. 253-257) for a discussion of the desire of performing
 arts groups to perform contemporary works, and the adverse consequences this has for demand.
 21 The level of q at which Pq(n, q) reaches zero should presumably depend on n. For very
 low values of n, at which point one is dealing only with true enthusiasts, Pq might even remain
 positive for all values of q.
 22 Moore (1968, pp. 120-121, 122) also makes a brief, though puzzlingly dismissive, reference
 to "price discrimination,, as a possible rationale for performing arts subsidies, by which he evi-
 dently means something like the declining-average-cost rationale suggested here.
 I should emphasize that I am speaking here only of subsidies for the performance of existing
 works. Subsidies to authors and composers for the creation of new works are an entirely different
 matter. It is often extremely difficult for an artist to capture for himself even a small fraction of the
 benefits society derives from his work, and thus there is much to be said for subsidizing them.
 Since public acceptance of new works often lags considerably behind their creation, and since it is
 probably helpful to the artist to see his work performed when he produces it, this may also lead
 to some justification for subsidies to performing arts groups that are specifically earmarked for
 performance of new works. (The Ford Foundation, for example, has sometimes pursued this
 course; see Ford Foundation (1974, Vol. 1., p. 42).)
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 with its productions, then it is possible that a subsidy will lead to more efficient
 levels for price and output. But this need not be the case. As the following
 discussion shows, a subsidy can in some cases lead to even greater inefficiency,
 quite apart from its likely adverse distributional consequences.
 ? The general model. For the moment I shall confine the analysis to a lump-
 sum subsidy. Similar results for other kinds of subsidies follow directly from
 the analysis in later sections.
 Consider the same firm modeled above, except that its revenue now in?
 cludes a lump-sum subsidy, L. Thus the firm now seeks to maximize U(n, q)
 subject to
 NR = nP(n, q) + D(n, q) + L - C(n, q) = 0.  (18)
 Assuming an interior solution, the first-order conditions for a constrained
 maximum with respect to n and q are unchanged from (4) and (5) above; the
 constraint (18) becomes the third condition. In diagrammatic terms, the con?
 sequence of increasing the subsidy, L, is to enlarge the closed curve represent?
 ing the nonprofit constraint, as shown in Figure 2. The loci NRn = 0 and
 NRq = 0 remain unchanged. The quality maximizer, which operated at point
 a without the subsidy, will operate with the subsidy at point a, while the
 audience maximizer will shift from b to b.
 To determine whether such shifts will lead to an increase in social welfare,
 we can differentiate (7) with respect to L,
 dL dL dL
 Pq(v, q)dv - Cq
 LJO
 dq rn ^ ^ dn




 THE EFFECT OF A LUMP-SUM SUBSIDY
 q* f^Rn = NRn=0
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 and then evaluate (19) by using simple comparative statics to determine dqldL
 and dnldL for the firm.
 For simplicity, I shall confine the analysis to the polar cases of the
 audience-maximizing firm and the quality-maximizing firm.
 ? The quality maximizer. Consider first the quality maximizer. Setting
 Uq = 1 and Un = 0 in (4) and (5), and totally differentiating (4), (5), and (18)
 with respect to L yield:
 dn NRan (20)
 dL NRQNRn
 dq -1
 ~d~L ~ NR0
 (21)
 Since the quality maximizer operates where NRq < 0, it follows from (21) that
 dqldL > 0: increasing the subsidy, L, will, as expected, cause the quality maxi?
 mizer to raise its quality level.
 Whether an increase in the subsidy will also generally lead to an increase
 in the size n of the audience that sees a given production is less certain.
 Since NRq < 0, and since, if the second-order condition holds, NRnn < 0, the
 sign oi dnldL is the same as that oiNRqn, which equals Pq - Cqn + (1 - 8)nPqn
 when the donation function is given by (1). Given that Pq > 0, Cqn > 0 (if we
 are again speaking of quality in the first ofthe two senses defined in Section 323),
 and Pqn g 0, it follows that NRqn, and thus dnldL, are indeterminate in sign.
 Conditions favorable to an audience increase are: (1) a low value of Cqn (in?
 creasing the audience does not much increase the cost of quality), and (2) Pqn
 > 0 (the new (marginal) audience members admitted have an unusually strong
 taste for quality).
 Turning to the welfare implications of such behavior, we have Sn = P - Cn,
 and as discussed in Section 3 this will always be nonnegative for the quality
 maximizer. Thus, increases in audience size are unambiguously desirable
 for the quality maximizer. On the other hand, the desirability of an increase
 in quality is less clear; using (1), we have:
 s? =  Pg(v, q)dv - C, = (1 - 8)  P?(v, q)dv - nPg  -j-. (22)
 Since X > 0, this expression will be unambiguously negative whenever Pqn
 > 0. Only where Pqn < 0 can Sq be positive.
 The overall effect on welfare of increasing the subsidy, L, is therefore
 indeterminate. The condition required for the first term in (19), Sq[dq/dL],
 to be positive, Pqn < 0, is simultaneously conducive to a low, and possibly
 negative, value for the second term, Sn[dn/dL]. It is easy, however, to con-
 struct examples in which increasing L decreases welfare, even though the quality
 maximizer's ticket price in the absence of a subsidy is well above marginal
 cost.24 Such a case is illustrated in Figure 2 (which is drawn so that Pqn > 0),
 where a lies on a lower iso-social-welfare curve than does a.
 23 As in Section 3, the results here and below can be reinterpreted for the case in which
 q represents quality of the second type by assuming, instead, that Cq = 0 and that, beyond some
 level ofq,Pq < 0.
 24 As an example, consider a quality-maximizing firm that faces a demand function
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 ? The audience maximizer. Turning to the audience maximizer we have
 (23)
 (24)
 By logic parallel to that employed in analyzing the quality maximizer, it follows
 that dnldL > 0, while the sign of dqldL is the same as that of NRqn, and
 therefore ambiguous.
 From (19), an increase in n will be desirable as long as P > Cn. Using
 (1), the Sq term in (19) becomes
 SQ = (1 - 5)  Pq(v, q)dv - nPq
 o
 (25)
 Thus sgn Sq = -sgn Pqn. If follows that Sq[dqldL], and hence (19), are ambiguous
 in sign: it is possible that a lump-sum grant to an audience-maximizing
 firm, as to a quality maximizer, can lead to a reduction in welfare, even when,
 in the absence of a subsidy, the firm is operating where P > C?.25 (Figure 2
 illustrates a case where dSldL > 0.)
 6. Donation subsidies
 ? In fact, subsidies to the performing arts are frequently not lump-sum in
 nature, but rather take the form of matching grants for donations?that is,
 fju dollars of subsidy are given for every dollar in individual donations received
 by the organization. This is true, for example, of a substantial portion of the
 performing arts grants provided by the National Endowment for the Arts, and
 of some foundation and corporate grants as well. It is also the approach that
 characterizes what is by far the largest public performing arts subsidy program
 of all, namely, the deductibility of contributions under the federal personal
 income tax.26 Are such donation subsidies superior to lump-sum subsidies?
 ? The general model. In making the comparison I shall assume, as seems
 empirically the case (Feldstein, 1975a and b; Feldstein and Clotfelter, 1976),
 that donations respond positively, if at all, to a matching subsidy. Thus, if
 n = Vq[A - P] or equivalently the inverse demand function P = A - nNq, so that Pqn > 0.
 Assume also that the firm's cost function takes the simple form C = q + n and that the subsidy
 level L is initially zero. Solving the first-order conditions for q and n and substituting these values
 into (19) gives dSldL = -1/(2 - 8). Thus here dSldL < 0 for all values of 8 between 0 and 1.
 (In this example dqldL = 2 > 0, dnldL = 2/(A - 1) > 0.)
 Note that here P - Cn = (A - 1)[(1 - 8)/(2 - 8)], and therefore P > Cn so long as A
 > 1,0 < 8 < 1.
 25 For example, assume that an audience maximizer faces the demand and cost functions in
 the preceding footnote, and assume that initially L = 0. Then dSldL = (2 - 58)/3(2 - 8), so
 that dSldL < 0 for 8 > 2/5. Here P - Cn = (A - 1)(2 - 38)/3(2 - 8), so/)> Cn whenever
 8 < 2A and A > 1. In this case (assuming A > 1), dnldL = 3/(A - 1) > 0, dqldL = % > 0,
 S? = (A - 1)(2 - 38)/3(2 - 8) > 0 for 8 < 2A and 5? < 0 for 1 > 8 > %, Sq = -(1 - 8)/(2 - 8)
 < OforO < 8 < 1.
 26 Netzer (1978, pp. 44, 95) estimates the cost to the federal government of the deduction for
 gifts to arts organizations as $400 million or more, while he estimates total direct public support of
 the arts at all governmental levels as just under $300 million for 1975.
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 fi is the rate at which donations are matched, thenD = D(n, q, fx), dD/d/x > 0.
 In particular, I shall sometimes assume (as a special case of (1)) that
 D(n,q, /x) = 8(/x) P(v,q)dv - nP(n,q)
 o
 (26)
 where 8'(/x) > 0.
 With a donation subsidy at a rate fx, the firm's nonprofit constraint becomes
 NR = nP(n, q) + (1 + fx)D(n, q, fx) - C(n, q) = 0. (27)
 If the firm maximizes U(n, q) subject to this constraint, the first-order condi?
 tions are, in addition to (27),
 P + nPn + (\ + fi)DH - Cn = - ^1 (28)
 A
 nPQ + (1 + M)Dg - Cq = - ?? , (29)
 A
 where X is a Lagrange multiplier.
 Proceeding as in the case of the lump-sum subsidy, we can evaluate the
 effect of an increase in the subsidy rate /x on n, q, and S by differentiating
 (27)-(29) with respect to fx, solving for dn/d/x and dq/d/x, and then deter?
 mining dS/d/x by means of
 dS ? dq ? dn
 d/x d/x dfx
 Pq(v, q)dv - Cq
 o
 %- + [P-Cn]%L. (30) d/x d/x
 ? The quality maximizer. For the quality maximizer we have
 ^L = ^ [D + (lDA + ^L DfL (31)
 d/x dL dL
 -A = -A [D + /xDJ + -A DM - -4- [Dn + (1 + /i)DnM] (32)
 ^5 dS r ^ ^ , dS ^ (P ? Cn) r r-v ,. x r^ -. ,??x
 _ = _ [D + /xDJ + ? DM - xyp w; [Dn + (1 + /x)DnJ, (33) dfx dL dL NRnn
 where dqldL, dnldL, and d57dL are the effects upon q, n, and S of a one-dollar
 lump-sum subsidy as given above by (21), (20), and (19), respectively.
 Here L>M = dD/dfx > 0 reflects the increase in private donations induced
 by the increase in the matching rate fx. (In the case of (26), DM = (8'/8)D.)
 The expression D + fxD^ gives the dollar increase in expenditure on the subsidy
 associated with a unit increase in fx. The first term on the right-hand side of
 (31)?(33) reflects the direct effect of the increase D + fxD^ in expenditure on
 the subsidy; this effect has the same sign and magnitude as would an equivalent
 expenditure on a lump-sum subsidy, as analyzed above. The second term on the
 right-hand side of (31)?(33) reflects the additional effect resulting from the in?
 crease in private donations induced by increasing fx.
 Turning to the third term on the right-hand side of (32), we have, using
 the donation function (26),
 Dn + (1 + fx)Dn^ = -[8 + (1 + fx)8']nPn. (34)
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 This expression is positive, and thus, since NRnn < 0 by virtue ofthe second-
 order condition, the final term in (32) is positive. This term reflects the incentive
 to increase n (and lower P) given to the firm by virtue of the fact that, with a
 higher fx, the firm will effectively be able to capture a larger fraction of the
 increase in consumer surplus created by such a move. The final term in (33)
 derives from the increase in n reflected in the final term in (32), and will be
 positive whenever P > Cn.
 It follows from (33) that, in terms of our welfare measure S, a donation
 subsidy will always be superior to an equivalent expenditure on a lump-
 sum subsidy in any case in which a lump-sum subsidy would itself be justifiable
 (i.e., where dSldL > 0). The extent by which the donation subsidy dominates
 an equivalent lump-sum subsidy is given by the second and third terms on the
 right-hand side of (33), reflecting, respectively, the increase in private donations
 and the increase in the donation matching rate fx.
 ? The audience maximizer. For the audience maximizer we have
 dfx dL dL NRqq
 dn dn r _ ^ , dn _
 ? = ? [D + /xDJ + ? DM
 d\x dL dL
 dS dS rrk ? ^ dS ?
 -=- [D + fxD^] + -DM +
 d/x dL dL






 where dqldL, dnldL, and dSldL are the effects of a unit increase in the
 lump-sum subsidy as given by (24), (23), and (19).
 The interpretation ofthe first two terms on the right-hand side of (35)-(37)
 parallels that given for (31)?(33) above. Using the donation function (26),
 the final term in (35) becomes
 -NRq
 NRoa
 -[8 + (1 + /x)8']  Pq(v, q)dv - nPq
 NRQ
 (38)
 which has the same sign as Pqn (since NRqq < 0 by virtue of the second-order
 condition). This term reflects the increased incentive to adjust quality to con-
 form to the tastes of inframarginal donors that the firm faces owing to the
 larger fraction of consumer surplus that it can (in effect) capture with a
 higher value of /x. The final term in (37) reflects the same phenomenon. Using
 (26), that term becomes
 Pq(v, q)dv - nPq
 -NRa
 NRa
 [8 + (1 + >x)8']  Pq(v, q)dv - nPq
 NRn
 (39)
 This term will always be nonnegative, reflecting the fact that bringing quality
 more into line with average, as opposed to marginal, audience members will
 always enhance consumer welfare as measured by S.
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 It follows from (37), then, that whenever dSldL > 0, a lump-sum subsidy
 is dominated by a donation subsidy of equivalent amount?or, in other words,
 for the audience maximizer as for the quality maximizer, a donation subsidy
 is to be preferred to a lump-sum subsidy whenever a subsidy of either type
 is justifiable at all.
 ? Summary. The advantages of the donation subsidy here are two-fold. First,
 by inducing further donations it yields to the firm a larger increase in revenue
 per dollar of subsidy than does the lump-sum subsidy. Note, in this connec-
 tion, that since part of the increased revenues due to a donation subsidy
 come from donors who benefit from?and value highly?the performances
 involved, donation subsidies also have stronger equitable appeal than do lump-
 sum subsidies, at least where public funds are the source of the subsidy.27
 Second, a subsidy geared to donations gives the firm an additional incentive
 to attract donations. Since we have been assuming that donations are propor?
 tional to consumer surplus, this means that with a donation subsidy the firm
 has an incentive to adjust its quality and price (or, equivalently here, audience
 size) closer to the levels that maximize consumer welfare.
 7. Ticket subsidies and taxes
 ? Admissions subsidies for the performing arts might also seem attractive
 (Netzer, 1978, pp. 32-33). Such subsidies might take either of two forms. First,
 the subsidy can be offered on the basis of a fixed amount per admission,
 regardless of the price charged for admission. Second, the subsidy can be
 designed to match total admissions (ticket) receipts on a fixed percentage basis,
 similar to the donation subsidy discussed above. In both cases incentives will
 be created for the organization that are absent in the case ofa lump-sum subsidy.
 At present neither of these types of admission subsidies is common. How?
 ever, a negative subsidy applied to total ticket receipts, in the form of a sales
 tax on theater tickets, has commonly been applied to commercial performing
 arts groups and sometimes to nonprofit organizations as well. Since the effects
 of such a tax are precisely the reverse of those resulting from a subsidy of the
 same type, analysis of the subsidy also yields an analysis of the tax.
 ? The model. I shall confine myself here to analysis of a per-receipts subsidy.
 Rather similar results follow from an analysis of a subsidy of a fixed amount
 per admission.
 Let cr represent the rate at which ticket receipts are matched by the ticket
 receipts subsidy, so that the total amount expended through this subsidy is
 crnP. The firm's nonprofit constraint becomes
 (1 + a)nP + D - C = 0. (40)
 ? The quality maximizer. Proceeding as in the analysis of the donation sub-
 27 The donation subsidy modeled here has a matching rate fi that does not vary from one donor
 to another?as would be the case with a uniform tax credit, and as is typically the case with
 NEA grants. The subsidies channeled through the charitable deduction under the personal income
 tax, in contrast, involve a matching rate that ranges from 0% to 70% depending upon the donor's
 tax bracket. Such a deduction may well be dominated, in terms of both equity and efficiency,
 by a tax credit of equivalent amount. See Hochman and Rodgers (1977).
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 sidy, the effects of increasing the ticket subsidy rate for the quality maximizer are:
 ^- = ^LnP (41)
 da dL
 dn dn P + nPn
 -=- P- (42)
 da dL NRnn
 dS dS n /n ^ x P + nPn
 -=-nP - (P - Cn)- . (43)
 da dL NRnn
 The expression nP here represents the dollar increase in expenditure on
 the ticket subsidy associated with a unit increase in a. The first term on the
 right-hand side in (41)?(43) gives the direct effect of the increase nP in the
 amount of the subsidy; it is the same as the effect of an equivalent expenditure
 on a lump-sum subsidy. The final term in (42) will be positive if the firm is
 operating where demand is elastic (nPJP > -1), and negative otherwise, re?
 flecting the fact that the net-revenue-maximizing value of n (which is the value of
 n chosen by the quality maximizer) changes with a. It follows from (42) that
 a ticket subsidy will actually lead to a smaller increase in audience size (and
 thus, from (43), a smaller increase in welfare) than would an equivalent lump-
 sum subsidy if (as is possible) the quality maximizer is operating in the
 inelastic portion of the demand curve.28




 Since nPq/NRqq < 0, it follows from (44) that a ticket subsidy will lead to a
 larger increase in quality than will an equivalent expenditure on a lump-sum
 subsidy. The reason for this is that increasing a increases Pq, and hence raises
 the level of q that maximizes net revenue. As the final term in (46) indicates,
 this (additional) increase in q will raise, rather than lower, welfare only if Pqn < 0.
 ? Summary. Interestingly, for the audience-maximizing firm a ticket subsidy
 has no greater effect on audience size than does a lump-sum subsidy, while
 for the quality maximizer a ticket subsidy may actually lead to a smaller audience
 than would a lump-sum subsidy. For both the audience maximizer and
 the quality maximizer, there is a range of cases in which a ticket subsidy
 is dominated by a lump-sum subsidy in terms of our welfare measure S. From
 the results in Section 6 we can in turn conclude that there is a much larger
 class of cases in which a ticket subsidy is dominated by a donation subsidy?
 28 In the model developed here, the quality maximizer will operate where nPJP < -1
 when marginal cost (C?) is low and the increase in donations (?>?) in response to lower ticket prices
 is relatively large (see (5)).
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 though there may be instances in which a ticket subsidy is superior to both
 donation and lump-sum subsidies.
 8. Conclusion
 ? The live performing arts are commonly characterized by fixed costs that
 are high relative to marginal costs, and by overall demand that is relatively
 small. As a consequence, performing arts groups often must engage in price
 discrimination if they are to survive without subsidy. The opportunities for
 effective discrimination through ticket pricing are limited, however. Therefore,
 nonprofit firms, which can, in effect, employ a system of voluntary price
 discrimination, can often survive in areas of the performing arts where for-
 profit firms cannot.
 In many cases, free-rider incentives presumably keep donations below the
 level necessary for efficient production. In such cases, public subsidies can be
 justified on efficiency grounds, although such subsidies clearly present problems
 of equity.
 As it is, the arts in the United States, including the performing arts,
 receive public subsidies that compare favorably in amount with those provided
 in other industrialized democracies (Netzer, 1978, pp. 50-52). The United States
 is unique, however, in providing most of its public subsidies in the form of
 matching grants for private donations. This policy has a great deal to recommend
 it. Donation subsidies not only serve to increase the level of private contribu?
 tions, but may also cause performing arts groups to pay greater attention to the
 desires of inframarginal consumers.
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